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and the importance of laws.
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1.Tragedies and Law: the case of Medea
Medea is such a complex character that her heuris-
tic power seems to be an inexhaustible font, inspiring 
ancient and modern commentators to this very day.
The aim of this paper is to investigate Euripides’ 
Medea. This play has already received extensive treat-
ment in relation to its philological, literary, psycho-
logical, cultural, political, and of course ethical as-
pects. From a less treated point of view, I will discuss 
the elements of law that can be traced: I would like 
to show how Euripides’ Medea may be a significant 
source for the study of ancient Greek law (See Leão, 
2011; Hall, s.d.).
Tragedies are in most cases fertile grounds for 
analyzing the application of law, since they regularly 
involve all the important stages of life which the law 
generally applies to, albeit in the context of rather 
tragic scenarios: cases of murder, dispossession, theft, 
betrayal, alterations in political power, and everything 
else that can relate to the range of law may be involved. 
There is a trend in the past two decades that suggests 
that it is wrong to think of the tragedy as a means 
used by the poets to talk about their present (see Al-
len, 2005; but also Pepe, 2007): in this sense, the poets 
would have not written tragedies to talk about their 
contemporary culture; on the contrary, they would 
have written purely poetic works. However, tragedic 
authors undoubtedly wrote from their contemporary 
viewpoints and their works are undeniably connected 
with political and social elements and references. In 
the particular case of Medea, the play may certainly 
be connected with or be inspired by its present; for 
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instance when at vv. 120 ss. Euripides criticizes the 
power abuses with a typical 5th century B.C. lexicon.2 
De facto, the tragic context bears remarkable re-
semblance with the judicial one and is connected with 
it: in fact, both take place as a clash of unsolvable and 
opposite positions. As the scholar Allen points out 
well, Euripides adopts the style and instruments of 
contemporary court procedures (Allen, 2005, p. 375) 
and the legal discussion seems to be a premise for 
Euripides’ same works (Allen 2005, p. 375 n. 3). This 
is most readily demonstrated in Hecuba, the Trojan 
Women, Heracles and Heracleidae. Like tragic charac-
ters, the subjects involved in a court controversy de-
fend antithetical positions on the same topics. In the 
case of the Medea, an emblematic dialogue, evidently 
antilogic, is the one between Medea and Jason from v. 
446. For all this, I would say that the Sophistry-mold-
ed antilogy, made for the court, can also be found in 
the tragic scheme. Tragedy and judicial context share 
the same antilogic form. Being both antilogies, there 
cannot be a synthesis of the two positions: what in the 
law stands as a structural element of judgment, in the 
tragedy becomes the site of the conflict and the tragic.
In addition, focusing on Medea, the lexicon leads us 
to ponder over the law because terminology for laws, 
justice, and murder is well-represented. I will just give 
some examples to show some variations, beginning 
with “killing/murder” words. The term φόνος, for ex-
ample, is present in v. 852 (in the third stasimon when 
the chorus tries to persuade Medea not to kill the chil-
dren) and the verb κτείνω appears at least fourteen 
times (e.g. v. 1411); ἀποκτείνω appears three times 
(e.g. v. 486); κατακτείνω, at least twice (e.g. v. 505). 
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The written law, νόμος, appears at least three times, 
and also in another forms and contexts: in effect, there 
is an idea of acting «against the law» – ἄνομος in v. 
1000 – when in the fourth stasimon the chorus argues 
that the abandonment of Jason is outside the margins 
the law; there is the variant «παράνομος» – “against any 
norm,” which occurs when the Messenger declares Me-
dea has killed/murdered Glauce and Creon at v. 1121.
As for the lexicon related to justice, the term δίκη 
appears seven times. Forms of it are used, e.g., at v. 
1390, where Jason recalls the persecution of the Er-
inyes for justice; also in v. 219 and in v. 1316 when 
Jason says to Medea that she has to pay what she de-
serves; ἔνδικος appears twice, once at v. 1232, when 
the chorus deems the action of the divinity that in-
flicts so much suffering to Jason to be right.
Given the pervasive usage of such terminology in 
the noted contexts, the work is clearly deeply con-
cerned with portraying the sense of injustice connect-
ed to Medea's unease in relation to Jason’s deceptive 
betrayal, as well as the revenge motivating her own 
extreme actions. More broadly, this further demon-
strates that Euripides is concerned with incorporated 
themes of law and justice in his work, and that there 
are grounds to investigate in this direction.
These are the general ways in which Euripidean 
tragedy tends to parallel legal aspects of Greek cul-
ture. But, what can Medea, in particular, aid us in un-
derstanding with respect to ancient law? 
Medea is a mythological character rooted in the deep 
past of Greek culture; a past in which, with respect to the 
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juridical plane, the laws are still part of the oral dimen-
sion. The transition from the oral, essentially customary 
law, to the written one was very investigated and some 
scholars attempted to produce a scan of this transition.3 
Hence, the issue will be to figure out what belongs to the 
archaic dimension and what to the classical one, that is, 
if the law of which, intentionally or not, Euripides tells us 
is part of the archaic phase or the classical one.
On the basis of these considerations, we can al-
ready identify two key points:
i. Euripides’ Medea may insert in a context of un-
written law and the same way in one of written law;
ii. the Medea, though not intended to be a work of 
critical reflection upon its political or juridical pre-
sent, was yet nevertheless most likely inspired by its 
social and political contemporaneity.
2. Themis and Dike
At v. 160, Medea notably appeals to both Themis 
and Artemis, speaking of the marriage oaths which 
bound her to Jason 4:
ὦ μεγάλα Θέμι καὶ πότνι Ἄρτεμι, 
λεύσσεθ ἃ πάσχω, μεγάλοις ὅρκοις 
ἐνδησαμένα τὸν κατάρατον 
πόσιν;
O mighty Themis and my lady Artemis, do you see what 
I suffer, I who have bound my accursed husband with 
mighty oaths? (Kovacs, 1994). 
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It is fitting for Medea to appeal to Themis. Themis 
is the alter-ego of justice, as is clear from etymologi-
cal analysis. Themis is derived from the verb τίθημι, 
which means “what is set” or “what is in line with the 
order of the world.” By extension, ‘themis’ then refers 
to a sort of cosmic justice found in nature itself; it is the 
way things should properly be. So, Themis as goddess 
is the personification of the natural justice that arises 
from the cosmic order. In addition, as emphasized by 
Biscardi, the name of the deity and the word θέμιστες, 
that identifies the magical-religious formulas used to 
express the gods’ will, have the same root. Here, then, 
the reference to Themis is the recall of a total, natural 
order of justice. Themis is the center of Medea's invoca-
tion for the injustice caused by Jason's behavior. Arte-
mis is then invoked as the goddess who is linked to the 
female. So Themis and Artemis are referred to togeth-
er for the discovery of justice for a woman, that is the 
same Medea. Why doesn’t Medea appeal to Dike? In 
mythology, Dike is the daughter of Themis and Zeus, 
and is thus a more particular and narrow identity con-
cerning rightness and justice. Whereas Themis is the 
original sense of cosmic justice found in nature, Dike is 
the particular sense of justice realized in mortal court 
proceedings. But Medea appeals to Themis, the law of 
nature: this is connected to the force of nature and, in 
that sense, to the latter’s own magical power. This recall 
is in line with the nature of Medea, woman-sorceress 
in whom the natural balance is taken away when the 
man she loves leaves her. So there is an archaism in this 
recall to Themis that circumscribes the figure of Medea 
and that evokes before us a very specific area of the law, 
that of an archaic sense of justice that aspires to be in 
line with the cosmic order: evidently, this is a choice by 
Euripides. We should note that in v. 764 Medea refers 
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to Dike after meeting Aegeus, when she explains what 
her intent is. This is interesting because Dike, as the re-
alization of justice is called just when Medea decided 
the fate of her loved ones, that is, when she sees justice 
becoming true: when she decides the penalty, like after 
a trial, even if a personal one.
3. The Oath
The second element recalled in v. 160 is the oath.5 The 
oath is the covenant that has made the marriage bond 
between Medea and Jason. The oath represented in 
Greek culture the means through which relationships 
among people became increasingly concrete or the sta-
tus of a single person was consolidated. It is believed 
that the oath represented a way of governing the rela-
tions, with the aim of avoiding private revenge (see Zuc-
cotti, 2000, p. 9-19). Chronologically, this orally-based 
custom must belong to the archaic era (6th century B.C. 
and before), prior to the establishment of a robust writ-
ten legal system. It was not until the late VII-V centu-
ries that the initial legal instruments began to be settled 
upon – i.e. from the Laws of Draco of 621 B.C. to the 
reform of the Aeropagus of 462/461 B.C. by Ephialtes. 
The Laws of Draco seek to regulate the relations after the 
homicides to replace the revenge: this step will be a slow 
process of advancement of the judicial system with a 
progressive disappearance of the revenge, and therefore, 
of the need of the oath (Giordano, 2014, p. 464) which 
was, in 5th century B.C., practically no longer in force. 
By the 5th century B.C., in fact, the relevance and value 
of oath-taking, along with its practice, had largely dis-
appeared. The oral agreements of oaths had been effec-
tively replaced by written transcription of agreements, 
filed in court, and effectively enforced by tribunals.6
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Based upon Medea’s appeal to her oaths with Jason, 
she is still operating under an archaic context. Oaths 
are valid, sacred, and cannot be questioned or undone. 
On the one hand, the oath is a covenant between hu-
mans (in which the roles are not specified), and thus to 
break them is to break one’s Word, and damage one’s 
reputation. On the other hand, and perhaps more im-
portantly, oaths are secured in the name of the gods: 
thus, the oath is elevated from being a human fact and 
becomes a religious fact, a covenant between mortal 
and divine. Any transgression goes against the will of 
the gods, and it follows that the transgressor is thereby 
impious and subject to divine retribution.7 Given that 
all should fear angering the gods, all should be careful 
to follow and uphold their oaths, making sure their 
conduct does not violate them. So, oaths cannot be 
broken without harsh penalti, unless both parties that 
initially made an oath explicitly agree to modify or 
dissolve it. Given this, it is entirely understandable 
what Medea expects from Jason: that he complies his 
promise of love.
If the marriage between Medea and Jason is solem-
nized via oaths between themselves, then their mar-
riage arrangement would be highly irregular: there 
were not the ceremony8 and the practices that are nec-
essary to sanction the marriage bond, neither in the 
archaic modality nor in classical one.
In ancient times the wedding took place through 
either abduction9 or a purchase (ἔεδνα, a practice 
of the Homeric era10; that will be examined more 
closely later) by the bridegroom. These are not the 
cases of Medea and Jason: in fact, the abduction is 
actually recalled by Euripides at vv. 255-256, but this 
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is the only passage where Medea seems willing to 
deresponsibilize herself and be seen as a prey. Given 
that Euripides only briefly mentions the abduction 
in these verses, and otherwise portrays Medea as a 
responsable agent,11 it would seem that, other than 
referencing the version of the Medea myth provided 
by Herodotus (I 2, 2; see Cerbo-Di Benedetto, 2012, 
p. 29 n. 65), this reference is to be understood as 
part of an accusation game, which will be developed 
further below. 
Otherwise the marriage could be celebrated ac-
cording to the classical period practice (see Oakley 
– Sinos, 1993) which replaced the previous archaic 
ways of marriage. A classical marriage began with 
the promise, ἐγγύη, between the κύριος of the wom-
an and her future husband: this would have included 
a proper liturgy, along with and definite gestures. As 
the verb ἐγγυάω literally means to «put in the palm 
of the hand» (γυή), it is likely that the practice ini-
tially included the bride›s father placed the hand of 
his daughter in the hand of his future son-in-law. The 
fulfillment of the covenant should follow the solemn 
practice of this agreement. There were long feasts 
and, most of all, the couple was bound to go to co-
habit. Again, Medea’s description differs greatly from 
the classical traditions. Medea makes reference to 
a private oath, a μεγάλος ὅρκος, in which she, on her 
own, tied herself to Jason. Such private oaths did not 
serve to sanction marriage in either archaic nor clas-
sical times. Thus, from a legal perspective, it would 
seem correct to say that the relationship between 
Jason and Medea does not properly count as a mar-
riage. It was a pact, archaically inviolable and sacred 
to Medea (and the gods), and likely remains binding 
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upon Jason: however, it would not have served as 
a marriage contract. We do not know the content of the 
oath between Medea and Jason (or if it was one-way, Me-
dea's promise to Jason as vv. 162-163 might suggest) but 
we can imagine that if the agreement was bilateral then it 
would have included agreements to remain loyal, share 
and build a life together, as well as the possibility to have 
and take care of any children. At least because in vv. 340-
345 Medea, explaining to Creon the difficulties of an im-
mediate exile, says that the father of her children, Jason, 
does not bother to provide for them: so, this must have 
been allegedly part of their relationship and their pact.
As the drama unfolds, Medea refers back to her oaths 
with Jason at vv. 440 and 492. The importance of oaths 
to Medea is empahsized with the oath of Aegeus (vv. 
735-749), which Medea fervently insists upon.12 The 
oath of Aegeus, strongly required by Medea, goes from 
v. 735, and especially from v. 749. The oath of Aegeus 
is short and easy: no more guarantees are required than 
the spoken words and the gods invoked directly in the 
same oath. Medea dictates the words of the oath, and Ae-
geus repeats them: so, she is completely satisfied with the 
oath, that is the main guarantee for her. Jason has con-
travened the oath (so that Medea says that “the magical 
power of an oath has gone” in v. 440 and v. 492, and tells 
of the “charm of an oath that vanishes”), but here Medea 
clearly holds Aegeus to not betray. At least because, in 
turn, Aegeus has had the commitment of Medea to solve 
his problem of not having children.
4. The Status of Women
Leaving now the issue of the oath aside, let’s go back 
to Medea’s speech, the beautiful and long peroration 
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that starts at v. 214, in which she wants to ponder the 
status of women paying a special attention to the dif-
ficulties women face in their relationships with men 
and with society. Among other things, and this must be 
highlighted, Medea’s speech seems clearly addressed to 
the Greek women while she is barbarian. Her role as a 
barbarian is relevant for the whole length of the work, 
but it becomes very touching in vv. 536-538 when Jason 
highlights that he brought Medea among the Greeks 
who are superior and because of them she has learned 
about justice (δίκη) and laws (νόμοι).
Consider closely the text from v. 232-237:
ἃς πρῶτα μὲν δεῖ χρημάτων ὑπερβολῇ 
πόσιν πρίασθαι, δεσπότην τε σώματος 
λαβεῖν [...]
v. 236 
οὐ γὰρ εὐκλεεῖς ἀπαλλαγαὶ 
γυναιξὶν οὐδ οἷόν τ’ ἀνήνασθαι πόσιν.
First at an exorbitant price we must buy a husband and 
master of our bodies […]
For divorce is discreditable for women and it is not pos-
sible to refuse wedlock. (Kovacs, 1994).
In the speech, Medea refers to the suffering of 
women: a woman must pay to get married because 
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her family is obliged to bring a dowry to her future 
husband, so her family must provide the dowry to the 
groom of the daughter. Furthermore, even after pur-
chasing a husband, a woman cannot repudiate him, 
while the man can divorce his wife at will. In such a 
case, the woman ends up dishonored by a divorce, un-
wanted by her husband.
I examine the elements of Medea’s claims in turn 
below, beginning with the practice of providing a 
dowry. Euripides does not use the proper term for 
dowry, i.e. προίξ, but he instead uses a phrase that 
immediately recalls it (vv. 232-233). The dowry is 
seen as the money needed to buy a man by a wom-
an. Medea obviously expresses the point of view of 
the women, and certainly not the one of the society 
which sees the dowry as a quantity of goods accom-
panying the woman at the time of marriage and that 
will then be used to establish the following rights on 
the family property. The προίξ was necessary to en-
sure marriage realization (see e.g. Paoli, 1953) and in 
fact here Medea characterizes it as the first necessary 
condition to the marriage bond: she says that «we 
[the women] must (buy)»; thus, she highlights its ne-
cessity. The Greek word is just δεῖ that means «it is 
necessary», «it must.» Of course, this peculiar case 
cannot be decisive in determining whether the dowry 
was really binding for the construction of marriage, 
still it is a record that we can take into account. The 
dowry should naturally be accompanied by ἐγγύη, 
that is the marriage pact between the father (or who 
was in his stead) of the bride and the groom. The 
dowry had not a stable consistency, neither a precise 
nature. Usually it was made up of personal property 
such as money, slaves and the trousseau (as a personal 
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possession of the woman), that should stay substan-
tially intact during the woman's growth and that 
were needed for her sustenance once married. The 
husband could directly keep his wife›s dowry as long 
as he guaranteed her an interest rate of the 18% of 
its capital (Pomeroy, 1978, p. 66). The dowry could 
also be real estate, though it rarely was, and in some 
peculiar situations, the dowry could be not paid. In 
the latter case the husband provided a “bogus” con-
tract in which he attested a conveyance that did not 
take place in reality. The dowry corresponded to a 
total agreed value; so in the case of dissolution, the 
husband was supposed not to return the goods but 
the corresponding value as agreed.
Yet here, in Medea’s speech, we have a very particu-
lar interpretation of the dowry. Medea speaks of mar-
riage in reference to dowry (paid by the woman to the 
man) but in archaic terms. Indeed, in the archaic era, 
the marriage was contracted through the purchase of 
the woman. Here, Medea just uses πρίαμαι, the verb 
“to buy”, therefore she conceptually recalls the “pur-
chase” in the strict sense. The “buying and selling” was 
the practice through which an archaic wedding was 
taken out (as in Arist. Pol. II 1268 b 39): the marriage 
was stipulated by the man who bought the woman; 
she, therefore, was purchased by the future husband. 
In this step of Medea, we find, therefore, an archaic 
vocabulary that refers to the act of purchase of a wom-
an by a man: here, however, the sense is turned up-
side down. In fact, it is the woman who acquires the 
right to have a husband through the dowry, according 
to the desperate Medea. In the arcaic time, the most 
important part of marriage, from the economic point 
of view, was covered by the original family of the 
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groom (in fact, he is buying), later it is the bride’s one 
to provide a dowry (with any necessary exceptions, of 
course). An archaic vocabulary to criticize a contem-
porary practice: Euripides seems to propose this with 
a clever reversal of the parts.
Let’s now treat the possibility of disavowel and divorce 
(see Leão, 2011 and Cox, 2011). Even here Euripides 
seems to refer to the classical era custom. The man could 
disavow his wife. Repudiation, ἀπόπεμψις, took place 
without any justification: the man could disown his wife 
whenever he wanted; he only needed to pay her dowry 
back. The wife on the other hand could not divorce her 
husband but as a choice she could leave the household, 
ἀπόλειψις. And there is a clear note: in the repudiation 
by the husband, the wife is sent back to her family; in 
the case of abandonment of the household, the wife goes 
back to her family. This means that, in consequence of 
each choice, the outcome does not change. She always 
takes on the shame of returning to its original οἶκος, 
while her husband stays in their house or wherever he 
wants, according to his own free choice.
It could be the father (or who was in his stead) 
of the woman to file for the divorce, through 
ἀφαίρεσις: so, a third element is inserted in the pro-
cess of separation. This, though, only applied if the 
woman had not already had children by her hus-
band; then, in this case, the new family could not be 
questioned by her father. We also know that, even 
if the separation was requested by the woman, the 
support of her family was necessary: the father or 
who was in his stead (a brother for example) had to 
follow her to court in order to file for the divorce. 
In fact, in the practice of ἀπόλειψις she needed the 
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intercession of her father or some other male citizen 
to bring the case before the Archon (Arist. Ath Pol. 
59: probably one of the Thesmothétai). The Archon 
recorded the separation (γράμμα ἀπολέιψεος). The 
procedure of transcription was meant to secure 
the woman, who, supported by her family and for 
specific reasons, needed to get out of the marriage 
without dishonor. (see Is. 3, 78 and Dem. 30, 17). 
She would have surely incurred dishonor if she, on 
her own, tried to get a divorce: she could not access 
the legal transcription of the separation act, be-
ing thus linked forever to her husband who would, 
eventually, reject her later. In the Medea, we pos-
sibly have a mention of a wife-wanted divorce that 
could put the blame on her, but I think that it must 
be conceived in the context of the classical era: 
Medea’s reflection is no exception, but it falls with-
in the rules of classical divorce: a woman could not 
divorce for her ‘only’ will (v. 236).
It is likely this interest in the details of dowry and 
divorce does not have much to do with the mythi-
cal character of Medea. After all, if Medea and Jason 
united through an oath, they did not follow the tra-
ditional practice of marriage: so why should the nor-
mal practices of marriage dissolution be relevant, if 
there was no marriage? Rather, Euripides is offering 
proposes an insightful and didactic take on classi-
cal legislation – a reflextion that combines with the 
experience of its audience as the work treats what it 
is happening in its time. Hence, I ascribe these ele-
ments of law as a detail proposed by Euripides about 
the Attic classical law, on which he testifies. Euripi-
des reflects on himself, he seizes the opportunity 
of letting the same Medea speak, but it is not about 
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herself, about her story that Medea actually talks. So 
that the speech of Medea follows with what we might 
call the reflections of a woman with an almost uni-
versal character who complains that a man tired of 
the house life goes out and has fun, recalls the pain 
of giving birth, envies men’s life in the war. Here we 
can find the society of the classical period and con-
sequently its law.
5. The Exile
At vv. 252-8, Medea explains the particular diffi-
culties she will face as a foreigner, barbarian, if Jason 
abandons her.
ἀλλ οὐ γὰρ αὑτὸς πρὸς σὲ κἄμ ἥκει λόγος: 
σοὶ μὲν πόλις θ ἥδ ἐστὶ καὶ πατρὸς δόμοι 
βίου τ ὄνησις καὶ φίλων συνουσία, 
ἐγὼ δ ἔρημος ἄπολις οὖσ ὑβρίζομαι 
πρὸς ἀνδρός, ἐκ γῆς βαρβάρου λελῃσμένη, 
οὐ μητέρ, οὐκ ἀδελφόν, οὐχὶ συγγενῆ 
μεθορμίσασθαι τῆσδ ἔχουσα συμφορᾶς.
But your story and mine are not the same: you have a 
city and a father’s house, the enjoyment of life and the 
company of friends, while I, without relatives or city, 
am suffering outrage from my husband. I was carried 
off as booty from a foreign land and have no mother, no 
brother, no kinsman to shelter me from this calamity. 
(Kovacs, 1994).
Here Medea addresses the women’s chorus; a cho-
rus composed of women like her, but from Corinth, 
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and thus Greeks who possess certain privileges and 
safeguards she lacks. In emphasizing her foreign 
background, Euripides is emphasizing Medea’s trag-
ic loneliness (see Leão, 2011). These points, in addi-
tion to the fact that Medea and Jason have children 
together, may be Euripides’ way of referencing how 
laws for Athenian citizenship developed, and their 
effects upon mixed-marriages and their progeny. 
A further interesting analysis by Tarditi (1957) 
shows that Euripides might have thought about Me-
dea’s tragedy in relation with the facts of 451/450 
B.C. when in Athens, Pericles proposed a law, ap-
proved by the citizens, about citizenship.13 This law 
established that the Athenian citizenship must nec-
essarily be reserved for the newborns whose parents 
were both citizens (for the possible non-centrality 
of this law in Medea’s plot, see Lushnig, 2001).The 
law was probably not retroactive because otherwise 
Cimon (whose mother was a foreigner), would not 
have been tasked with leading the Athenian army 
against Cyprus, at Pericles’ own prompting. More-
over, we can see a subsequent wheat regulation that 
accounts for the number of people in the various 
demes, even after the law mixed births can be found: 
in the 445/444 B.C. the Athenians had to divide the 
wheat donated by the king of Libya, Psammeticus, 
and to this purpose lists of the inhabitants of the 
demes, which included mixed-provenience citizens, 
were compiled.
But the law was made and was later carried on 
even after Pericles. In fact, we know from the pseu-
do-Demosthenes’ speech Against Neera that mixed 
marriages were even forbidden by law (Against Neera 
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16; see Bakewell, 2008-2009). It is possible that as a 
result of this law, many foreign women were repu-
diated by Athenian men who were going to marry 
local women and have children with Athenian citi-
zenship as well.
Perhaps, Tarditi may have fallen a bit in the game of 
thinking of Euripides’ work as a disapproval towards 
this law: and I do not think that this can be done in an 
all-encompassing way, of course. But what he claims 
is relevant, many scholars have shared his reflection, 
and above all, this would also account pretty well for 
the reflections on the classical law we met in Medea’s 
speech to the chorus. So, I do not think we can exclude 
that the outcome of Pericles’ law may have influenced 
and stimulated the drama of Medea.
In the conversation between Medea and Creon, 
this, the king of Corinth, compels Medea to go into 
exile immediately (v. 271 et seq.). Medea cleverly per-
suades him to allow her to remain one more day, dur-
ing which she kills her children. However, here the 
concern is the language used with respect to exile. The 
vocabulary seems to be direct and occurs throughout 
the play: φυγή (exile), φυγάδα (from φυγάς-δος, ex-
iled); ἔξω (outside, over, beyond), περᾶν (beyond, on 
the opposite side). So, the recall to the exile seems not 
only correct but also legally clear. Creon in v. 276 uses 
the formula ἔξω βάλω (ἔξω βάλλω - to kick out) and 
similar forms elsewhere. That legal exile is demanded 
is clear. However, why is this the case? Medea has not 
committed a crime punishable by exile in Corinth.
There isn't any murder before, when Creon speaks 
with Medea. No wrongdoing has been attained yet. 
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For sure Medea threatened; Creon makes it clear: «I 
hear you threaten [...] to do something against who 
gave his daughter in marriage (i.e. Creon himself), 
against who married her (Jason) and against the wife 
(Creon›s daughter, Glauce)» (v. 286). Priot to list-
ing the threats Medea has made, Creon notes: «in no 
way shall we mask the words (the speeches)” (v. 282). 
Thus, it seems the grounds upon which Creon or-
ders her exile rests solely upon Medea’s threats. Here, 
the idea that language is efficacious on reality re-
turns (it is a performative action, bringing things to 
pass). Medea’s words do not remain mere promises 
or threats, but become facts, that which remains yet 
unaccomplished, but will indeed occur. It is on these 
facts that Creon imposes the exile, as confirmed by 
Jason’s comment to Medea that her expulsion was 
due to her reckless speeches in v. 450. 
The ancient world has always known the practice: 
voluntary exile in order to escape enemies and revenge 
was a stable custom. But an innovation of sense and use 
of the exile takes place with the Draconian legislation. 
In the Laws of Draco, the first table reads that the exile is 
the punishment for those who commit homicide μὴ ἐκ 
προνοίας i.e. without the intention to kill (involuntary 
homicide). Pepe thinks otherwise (2012, p. 22 et seq.), 
since she identifies the verb φεύγω, in the first line of 
the code, with going to trial, while she recognizes in the 
verb ἐξέρχομαι (and the alike derivations) the appro-
priate missing lexicon. It must be emphasized, though, 
that the text of Draco also talks about exile when it says 
that the family that was affected by the murder can for-
give the murderer, in which case he is not required to go 
into exile: that if the 51 ἐφέται (Ephets) would have him 
readmitted into his homeland. Therefore, the theme of 
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exile is present. Of course, there is no need to go deeply 
in Draco’s legislation: what we are hereby interested in 
is to fix the end of the custom of revenge; the Athenians 
are satisfied with getting something that is not revenge 
in exchange for the wrong they suffered. Thus a real re-
conformation, a remodeling of the revenge takes place: 
revenge is now sanctioned by the qualified branches 
and when the exile occurs, the offender can not be 
prosecuted once out of the country (from line 26 of the 
Laws) and this remodeling just starts with and after the 
Draconian legislation. Here in the text of Euripides, 
however, in my opinion, there is just an act of kicking 
out of the land of the kingdom by the king (that would 
be the legal authority delegated). The exile therefore is 
no longer only a getaway but an adequate punishment 
to a fault. But Medea has not committed a murder, not 
even an unintended one. She has yet to accomplish it: 
but she declared her will in point, so there is full inten-
tionality. Thus a paradoxical situation emerges. Creon, 
justifying with the fear of the crime that could be ac-
complished, more easily chooses the most feasible op-
tion, and the right one from his point of view, when he 
prefers the exile to the death penalty. In fact, the death 
penalty cannot be applied, since it would look like a big 
injustice, but the exile could be a feasible option and a 
good compromise.
Several conclusions can thus be drawn from this 
passage. First, Creon does not seek revenge, or even 
punishment for Medea: he but tries to protect his 
kingdom and family. When there cannot be a trial for 
murder (i.e. no killing has occurred), yet one threat-
ens violent harm to others, exile is a preferred and 
just solution.14 Euripides here, buries the dynamics 
of revenge (see Terradas Saborit, 2008; for its legal 
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status, see Giordano, 1999) and recalls the exile, a well-
known practice for the audience: the public gets the le-
gal aspect, the political and social value and this helps 
understanding the author’s poetical and even political 
reflection. Here, the recalled law might not be the ar-
chaic one but the classical one; and must therefore be 
placed between the legal elements that were contem-
poraneous to the author. Second, Euripides seems to 
be saying something important about the value and 
power of words and speech. As noted above, the pow-
er of speech and the way it turns into reality seems to 
be what Creon bases Medea’s punishment upon, and 
this is of course a power that was heavily emphasized 
by the 5th century B.C. sophist, Gorgias. In the Enco-
mium of Helen, at § 12, he explicates how language 
can be used to compel, in such a way that speech that 
becomes coercion. Whoever exercises the words this 
way is thereby guilty of the actions that the words led 
to. The responsibility lies on who has used them, be-
cause their use was voluntary, as dictated by the need 
to compel. Those who were compeled, on the other 
hand, are innocent, having been involuntarily moved 
by speech. The reflection of Gorgias on the power of 
speech is interesting not only because the responsibil-
ity for the use of the word as a means to coercion is set 
up, but also because it connects to the Greek idea of 
speech as a function of the law. In fact, there is no law 
if there is no word. The law is built on the word and 
the word becomes action. Even in the case of Euripi-
des, the word has a result, it foresees an outcome and 
thus forces others, in this case Creon to provide and 
to get the outcome, the legal result of such legal words. 
In the case of Medea, speech has a result; it points to 
an anticipated future ouctome, compelling others - in 
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this case, Creon - to respond to the speech in order to 
avoid the unwelcome outcome, by making a decree to 
counter it. Medea’s speech in-itself sullied and taint-
ed the city by creating their own miasma, a “murder 
in words”, which Creon attemtped to wash away by 
the removal of the one who engendered the evil, and 
promised to make it actual. Miasma is thus an implicit 
premise to the exile, though Euripides doesn’t explic-
itly refer to it.
Through these reflections, though, we are maybe 
going into a purely interpretive context; hence, it is 
perhaps more appropriate to refer to ostracism. Being 
Creon the very holder of legal power, he meets out 
the exile; still, such a decision can be referred to as 
ostracism only if the legal practices needed are over-
looked. He could have thought such a decision as os-
tracism, but he could only have done so on an entirely 
intimate and personal level. A recall to ostracism can 
be useful to decode the king’s decision. However, no 
akin procedure in the actual practice of ostracism can 
be found: there is no assembly, no vote, no ostrakon. 
The option of ostracism might therefore be assumed 
as part of the king’s executive autonomy, to a bigger 
extent, but it cannot be directly connected to the ac-
tual procedure, especially for what concerns the law 
of classical era. 
6. Medea like Helen
One final point should be considered regarding 
how Euripides at times portrays Medea as lacking re-
sponsible autonomy. In a 2014 article, Medea’s Four 
Reasons, Gemin shows that, according to Euripides, 
Medea followed Jason for at least one of four causes. 
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The first is the cause of Love, evidenced at vv. 6-8, 
when the nurse regrets the past events that led to the 
meeting of Medea and Jason and the birth of their 
love. The second cause is the Force (βία), as found 
in vv. 255-256, which claims Jason took Medea away 
with coercion to bring her along with him. The third 
cause is the divine will that in Medea mentions at vv. 
526-531. The fourth and final possible cause is the 
persuasion of Jason’s words, noted at vv. 800-802. This 
structure of possible causes is remarkably similar to 
the one Gorgias developed in his Encomium of Helen.
The Encomium of Helen is set up as a defense of the 
mythical character of Helen built by Gorgias on four 
main lines of argument: Helen either fled to Troy for 
the will of gods, case or necessity, or she was compelled 
through the use of force, or she was convinced by the 
words of Paris or she was beguiled by Love. For each 
of these reasons, Helen is innocent. Similarly, Euripi-
des, though not providing a programmatic statement 
of reasoning, as it instead can be found in Gorgias at § 6 
of the Encomium, offers the same arguments.
Let’s add further remarks, since there are more simi-
larities between both texts. I am referring not only 
to what I said before about the responsibilities of the 
words, but also to the fact that the two women who are 
chosen for these works are mythical female characters 
who do not enjoy a good reputation: both authors ar-
gue so, in the Encomium in § 2 and in Medea in v. 293.
Moreover, I suggest that there is a similarity in 
the argumentative form of “demonstrandum” (i.e. 
when the autor declares what is to be demonstrat-
ed). This form is intensively used by Gorgias, but it 
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is also present in Euripide’s Medea, e.g. in v. 535 where 
Jason announces that he will prove what he says.15 
There is also the theme of the requirement of knowl-
edge, similarly to: “if we do not know everything we 
need to know, we fall into error”. In fact, Medea talks 
about the bride towards the the groom (v. 239 as the 
woman needs to foresee), Gorgias speaks in general 
of knowledge at § 11. Finally, there is the reference to 
φάρμακον: as real poison in v. 385 of Medea, while on 
14 of the Encomium as a parallelism between this and 
the speech. Long story short, the two works seem to 
come from the same conceptual and lexical context, 
showing a relevant affinity.
If the case can be made for these texts parallel-
ing each other, we must then wonder who followed 
who: which author wrote first? There is no doubt 
that Medea was shown at the Great Dionisya of 431 
B. C. On the other hand, the composition of Gorgias’ 
Helen lacks any precise date. I have already consid-
ered this question at some length: my point of view 
is that Gorgias wrote it at the peak of his career, and 
thus while in Athens serving as ambassador, after his 
arrival in 427 B.C. (Giombini, 2012, p. 68-70). Thus, I 
think it was Gorgias who read Euripides’ Medea four 
or more years later its composition, and found inspi-
ration for his Helen. There is no reason to doubt that 
Gorgias could read Euripides’s play, as we know that 
there was a fair circulation of texts at that time (see 
Turner, 1977, p. 21-22). However, given the wide cir-
culation of texts, could not Gorgias have read Euripi-
des at an earlier time, while still abroad, and before ar-
riving in Athens? And, could not Euripides have read 
Gorgias and mimicked him (if it is thought that he 
had written earlier, and was the more novel thinker)? 
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Yes. However, there is no evidence of this. Efforts at 
more precise chronologies have not yielded any valid 
indications based upon similarities between Gorgias’ 
works with other Euripides’ tragedies, Helen and the 
Trojan Women. In any case, if my original proposal 
is correct (I have no reason to doubt it), then Gor-
gias wrote his Encomium after the year 427 B.C., and 
thus it would seem, based upon the arguments above, 
Euripides becomes a source of direct inspiration for 
Gorgias to develop his argumentative exercises. That 
both authors were able to use the myth of Medea in 
their own unique ways is important, allowing us in-
sights into aspects of logical exercises, the power of 
speech, and the development of laws.
7. Conclusions
Euripides’ Medea ultimately seems an interest-
ing source for reflection upon various aspects (oaths, 
marriage, dowry, exile) of criminal and family law in 
Athenian contexts, under both archaic and classical 
frameworks. The work is also marked by the distinct 
references to Themis and Dike: this lexis precisely 
leads us in two different fields. In fact, Euripides is 
able to play on a double range: on the one hand he 
recalls elements of the archaic law as in the case of 
the oath, on the other he refers to the 5th century B.C. 
Athenian laws. The two planes interact because they 
get a modulation within the character of Medea. Me-
dea the barbarian, the sorceress, the figure of myth 
adapts to the archaic law; but when she looks for a 
comparison with the Greek woman (in the dialogue 
with the chorus in the parodos) Euripides inserts the 
elements of his contemporaneous law. Finally, this 
inquiry into the Medea also offers insight into how 
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language informs and grounds the law, and how 
Greeks were responding to the recognition of that 
power, in terms of legal guilt or innocence.
Notes
1 I am grateful to Delfim Leão and Jeremy DeLong for their 
careful reading and their helpful comments. Any inconsistency 
or carelessness remains my responsibility.
2 In particular, at v. 122, he uses ἐπ’ἴσοισιν, “on terms of 
equality”; see Cerbo-Di Benedetto (2012, p. 15, n. 31).
3 Michael Gagarin (1989) did so, distinguishing between the 
proto-legal stage, the pre-legal one, and the last, fully legal one, 
trying to show that legal procedure developed before and the 
content of the law after. Not everybody agreed with Gagarin, but 
he posed the issue of the demarcation between the statement of 
customary practices and the presence of the written law well.
4 On the relationship Themis-Dike, the literature is wide but 
for our juridical approach, see Biscardi (1982), Appendice III.
5 For a discussion see Sommerstein-Torrance (2014); see 
also the project “The Oath in Archaic and Classical Greece” of 
the University of Nottingham.
Available at: URL = http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/Classics/
Research/projects/oaths/intro.aspx. Available on: July 15, 2016.
6 Like, just for instance, in the practice of adoption, when 
the document was recorded in court in the proper register.
7 See Fletcher (2014), esp. p. 165 s.: 7.1.5.1 Unofficial oaths 
in Athens.
8 The myth states that the Argonauts threw a big party, but 
this feast and the practices that might follow could not fit as a 
regular marriage.
9 There is an extensive literature on this issue. See e.g. Carey 
(1995); Pierce – Deacy (2002).
10 There are four recalls in point in the Odissey, I 277, II 196, 
VIII 318, XV 18, and two more in Hesiod, fr. 199, 9 e fr. 200, 4.
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11 In its various forms and telling, the myth of Medea regu-
larly shows complete autonomy of the woman, also in the kill-
ings she performs herself, or is the proximal cause of. Just a list 
of her actions: Medea personally kills her brother Apsyrt after 
Jason’s arrival at Colchis (this episode is recalled by the same 
Euripides, v. 167). Apsyrt’s limbs are then thrown overboard by 
the two lovers as they flee by ship. In his pursuit, Medea’s father 
Aeëtes, is forced to pick up Apsyrt’s body piece-by-piece, slow-
ing him down enough to prevent his capture of the two fugitives. 
Medea also personally kills Talos, the bronze giant Minos placed 
as a guard for Crete. She indirectly kills Pelias by convincing his 
daughters that were they to kill him, their father would resur-
rect as a younger man (in Med. v. 486, 504-505). She is the one 
ultimately responsable for killing the dragon guarding the fleece 
(in Med. v. 480), and then goes on to kill Glauce and her father, 
King Creon. She causes Perses’ death, giving his son Medo a 
sword (another version conveys that she killed him). Finally, and 
perhaps most notably and controversially, she kills her own two 
children (according to one version of the myth, she also kills Ja-
son because he would die of grief over the loss of his children).
12 For the centrality of this episode, see Rizzatti (2016).
13 This law is handed down by Aristotle in Ath. Pol. 26.4 and 
is also recalled in Plutarch, Per. 37.3.
14 Precautionary detention was not reckoned in the 5th cen-
tury B.C.: see Giombini (2012, p. 228) on this issue in Pl. Lg. IX, 
871e-872b and Gorg. Pal. 35.
15 Here the verb is φράζω. It must be stressed that the 
lexicon is not the same because Gorgias, in fact, uses the verb 
ἐπιδείνυμι; see Giombini (2012, p.72 et seq).
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